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TORTS - INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY - MARYLAND ABRO-
GATES INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN CASES OF OUTRAGE-
OUS INTENTIONAL TORTS. LUSBY v. LUSBY, 283 Md. 334, 390 
A.2d 77 (1978). 
In Lusby v. Lusby, l the Court of Appeals of Maryland modified 
the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity by allowing 
a wife's action against her husband for an outrageous intentional 
tort. With this decision Maryland joins an increasing number of 
jurisdictions that have either limited or abolished tort immunity 
between spouses.2 Unlike many states that have abolished inter-
spousal immunity in all tort cases,3 and others that have abrogated it 
in negligence4 or intentional tort suits,5 the Maryland court 
abrogated the immunity only in those cases involving outrageous 
intentional torts. 
This Note analyzes the Lusby decision and its impact on 
Maryland law and advocates a further abrogation of the immunity 
in Maryland for all cases involving intentional torts between 
spouses. Particular emphasis is placed on the court of appeals' 
abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in light of the recent trend 
in other jurisdictions. 
I. LUSBY v. LUSBY - THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Diana Lusby brought a civil action against her husband and his 
two companions on charges of assault, battery, rape, false imprison-
ment, and intentional infliction of emotional injury.6 Mrs. Lusby 
1. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). 
2. A majority of states have modified or completely abrogated the immunity. See 
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). 
3. E.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Beaudette v. Frana, 
285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). 
4. E.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Richard v. Richard, 131 
Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973). 
5. E.g., Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 
S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977). 
6. Mrs. Lusby prayed for compensatory and punitive damages. Brief for Appellant 
at 1, 2, Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). 
7. The court of appeals did not address the issue of rape. Under Maryland law, a 
husband is immune from prosecution for rape of his wife. "A person may not be 
prosecuted [for rape] if the victim is the person's legal spouse at the time of the 
commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense unless the parties 'are living 
separate and apart pursuant to a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro." MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 464D (1976). See generally Note, Litigation Between Husband and 
Wife, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1650 (1966). 
[A] husband is immune from prosecution for rape of his wife .... [I]t is 
reasonable in many marital situations to assume actual consent to 
intercourse, but the husband's immunity applies even if it is clear that in 
fact the wife explicitly refused. Her husband's immunity might in such 
cases be said to rest on her irrevocable consent at the time of marriage. It 
is doubtful, however, that such an irrevocable consent is generally 
anticipated by wives .... The absolute privilege therefore appears as 
an imposed term of the marital bargain. 
Id. at 1663 (emphasis in original). 
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alleged that her husband, Gerald Lusby, forced her to engage in 
sexual intercourse without her consent,7 and aided two companions 
in sexually assaulting her. Mrs. Lusby charged that while she was 
driving her automobile her husband pulled alongside of her in his 
truck and pointed a high-powered rifle at her. When she attempted to 
flee, another truck driven by her husband's two companions forced 
her off the road. Mr. Lusby then took control of his wife's automobile 
and drove down the road, followed by his two companions. Shortly 
thereafter, Gerald Lusby forced his wife into his truck where he 
allegedly struck her, tore her clothes off, and had forced sexual 
relations with her. Mr. Lusby then assisted his two companions in 
attempting to rape his wife. 
Mr. Lusby demurred to the declaration on the grounds that he 
was married to Mrs. Lusby at the time of the alleged offense and 
that the common law prohibited tort suits between spouses. The 
demurrer was overruled8 and Mr. Lusby then filed a preliminary 
motion9 asserting that a wife lacks standing to sue her husband for 
a personal tort. The motion was granted and the trial court 
dismissed the case. An appeal was filed in the court of special 
appeals and, while the case was pending, certiorari was granted by 
the court of appeals.1o 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY 
A. The Common Law 
The roots of interspousal immunity are buried in the English 
common law,ll formulated in an era when the matrimonial act 
stripped the wife of certain property rights and suspended her legal 
existence.12 Common law disabilities incident to marriage prevented 
8. The demurrer was overruled because nothing on the face of the declaration 
established that Diana and Gerald Lusby were husband and wife. Mr. and Mrs. 
Lusby were, however, married to each other at the time of the incident. They had 
been separated for approximately fourteen months and Mrs. Lusby had filed for 
a suit for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. They were subsequently divorced on 
April 26, 1976. Brief for Appellant at 3, Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 
(1978). 
9. Mr. Lusby filed a motion raising preliminary objection pursuant to Maryland 
Rule 323. 283 Md. at 336, 390 A.2d at 78. 
10. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 337, 390 A.2d 77, 78 (1978). The court of appeals 
granted certiorari prior to oral arguments in the court of special appeals 
pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1974). 
11. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 306-07 (1877). See generally 1 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF 
TORTS, Ch. 23 § 8.10 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; W. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; 
McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 
(1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy]. . 
12. E.g., Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1977). See generally 1 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. 
At common law a woman's capacity to hold or receive title to property 
was not destroyed by marriage, but marriage had important consequen-
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married women from asserting their rights as individuals, rights 
separate from those shared with their husbands. 
Maryland, like most states, has long followed the traditional 
common law rule that a wife could not bring an action in law 
against her husbandP Historically, this doctrine of interspousal 
immunity developed from the common law theory that during 
marriage the legal existence of the wife was merged into that of the 
husband, thereby creating a single "unity."14 A married woman 
could sue and be sued only by joining her husband. Suits between 
spouses were barred for lack of capacity because such actions would 
have placed each of the parties in the dual role of both plaintiff and 
defendant.15 
Throughout the development of case law on interspousal tort 
immunity, several theories have been advanced in support of the 
common law doctrine. Originally, interspousal immunity was based 
on ancient concepts of public policy favoring preservation of peace 
and harmony in the home,ls and that rationale was most frequently 
applied by the courts to justify the immunity. This concern was the 
earliest justification for interspousal immunity in Marylandl7 and 
ces. It gave a man a right to use and enjoy whatever property his wife 
owned at the time of marriage or acquired during coverture. A husband 
acquired a right to possess his wife's real estate and to enjoy the rents 
and profits thereof, but the fee remained in the wife .... In view of the 
perishable nature of chattels, and the common law denial of estates 
therein, his right to use these involved such complete dominion as to 
amount to ownership, and consequently marriage was said to give him 
the legal title by operation of law. 
McCurdy, supra note 11, at 1031-32 (footnote omitted). 
13. The first Maryland case exemplifying this doctrine was Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 
214 (1870). In Barton, a wife's suit for the recovery of money loaned by her to her 
husband prior to the marriage was denied by the court. Later Maryland cases 
extended the doctrine of interspousal immunity for acts occurring during the 
marriage as well. E.g., Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 
(1927). Due to the complexity and possible variations of interspousal tort suits 
regarding acts committed prior to marriage versus those occurring during 
marriage, and those involving actions by married spouses versus divorced 
spouses, a comprehensive analysis of these facets of interspousal immunity is 
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Farage, Recovery For Torts Between 
Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290, 292-94 (1934). 
14. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1910). See generally 1 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-43; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 859 ("Any 
tort action between husband and wife encountered at the outset the common law 
doctrine of the legal identity of the two. It has been said ... that at common law 
husband and wife were one person, and that person was the husband .... "). 
15. See, e.g., Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876). See generally HARPER & JAMES, 
supra note 11, at 643; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 860; McCurdy, supra note 11, at 
1032. 
16. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,617 (1910); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 
195 Minn. 523, 526, 263 N.W. 546,547-48 (1935). See generally Note, Litigation 
Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1650, 1650-54 (1966). 
17. Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214,224 (1870). 
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courts continued to apply it in denying an injured spouse access to 
the civil courts. Another theory advanced to uphold interspousal tort 
immunity was the strong possibility of collusion due to the 
confidential relationship between husband and wife,18 which could 
lead to the filing of spurious claims, particularly when one or both 
spouses carried liability insurance.19 Finally, some courts, conclud-
ing that criminal and divorce laws provide sufficient redress to an 
injured spouse,20 have emphasized that adequate alternative legal 
remedies are available. 
B. Married Women's Acts 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, economic and social 
progress led to the enactment of Married Women's Property Acts.21 
The primary purpose of those statutes was to secure to a married 
woman a separate legal identity as well as a separate legal estate.22 
Ultimately, Married Women's Acts were passed in every jurisdic-
tion.23 
Courts have been confronted with the question of whether the 
Acts gave a married woman standing to bring an interspousal tort 
suit. More specifically, the issue has been whether the married 
woman's separate legal identity, established by the statute, had the 
effect of modifying the common law immunity, or merely allowed a 
wife to sue third parties in her own name without joining her 
husband.24 Only a few statutes specifically addressed the issue of the 
married woman's right to bring a tort action against her husband.25 
18. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 310, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955). In Smith, the 
court stated that the confidential relationship between husband and wife 
increases the probability of fraud and collusion. See generally PROSSER, supra 
note 11, at 863. 
19. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969) 
(allowing interspousal tort claims when family member is insured creates strong 
temptation to file spurious claims). 
20. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910) (divorce adequate remedy); 
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877) (interspousal tort actions are 
unnecessary where criminal and divorce laws exist). Contra, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 
Wash. 2d 183, 187-88,500 P.2d 771, 774-75 (1972) (criminal and divorce laws do 
not adequately compensate for negligence). 
21. A thorough classification of the Acts can be found in McCurdy, Personal Injury 
Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 308-13 (1959). 
22. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. 
23. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 310 
(1959). 
24. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 46, 89 A. 889, 891 (1914). 
25. An example of a statute employing specific prohibitory language can be found in 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1973), which provides that "[a] married woman may, 
in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the same 
extent as if she were unmarried; provided that neither husband nor wife may sue 
the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture." Other statutes 
that deal specifically with interspousal tort suits are considered in McCurdy, 
supra note 21, at 312-13. 
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In most jurisdictions the legislative intent was difficult to ascertain 
because the statutes did not refer to the immunity doctrine in precise 
terms. 26 Therefore, the impact of the Acts varied from state to state. 
In 1910, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson 
interpreted the District of Columbia's Married Women's Acts, and 
held that a wife could not sue her husband in tort for assault and 
battery.27 The Court based its decision on statutory construction as 
well as policy considerations of public welfare and domestic 
harmony.28 In refusing to construe the statute to allow a wife a cause 
of action against her husband, the Court determined that if the 
legislative intent had been to effect such "radical and far-reaching 
changes"29 in the policy of the common law, clear and specific 
language in the Act would have been employed to indicate such a 
purpose.30 Justice Day concluded that "[t]he statute was not intended 
to give a right of action as against the husband, but to. allow the 
wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common 
law must be brought in the joint names of herself and husband."31 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices 
Hughes and Holmes, criticized the ruling on the ground that the 
statute on its face empowered married women "to sue separately. . . 
for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were 
unmarried."32 The dissenters concluded, therefore, that the legisla-
tive intent of the statute was to give a wife the right to sue her 
husband in tort and thus the majority's holding was in opposition to 
the plain meaning of the language of the statute. 
Until recently, a majority of state courts followed the Thompson 
decision and continued to apply common law justifications to uphold 
interspousal immunity.33 In most states, the courts concluded that 
the creation of a woman's separate legal identity without more was 
not enough to abrogate the immunity.34 Statutes which destroyed the 
marital unity but did not express a clear legislative mandate 
addressing the married woman's right to bring tort actions against 
their husbands were generally strictly construed. Such statutes, like 
26. E.g., Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962), overruling 
Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 
173 N.W.2d 416 (1969), overruling Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 
(1906). 
27. 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
28. Id. at 616-18. 
29. Id. at 618. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 617. 
32. Id. at 620 (emphasis in original) (citing D.C. CODE § 1155 (1901)). 
33. E.g., Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 253, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Austin v. 
Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924). 
34. E.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906); Austin v. 
Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 71, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924). 
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the District of Columbia Acts considered in Thompson, merely 
provided that married women could sue for torts committed against 
them as if they were unmarried. The courts reasoned that a change 
in the established common law rule could be effected only through 
clear and precise statutory language.35 Consequently, state courts 
concluded that while the statutes generally gave women the right to 
bring tort actions for wrongs committed against them, interspousal 
tort suits remained barred. 
The dissent in Thompson36 and the critical views of legal 
commentators,37 however, have provided an impetus for a change in 
the common law. The recent trend in an increasing number of 
jurisdictions has been to rely on the Married Women's Acts to 
abrogate interspousal immunity.3s Employing a liberal construction 
of the statutes, some courts have determined that giving the wife a 
separate legal identity had the effect of allowing tort actions 
between spouses.39 Other courts have concluded that where the 
statute did not specifically address the issue of interspousal 
immunity, the legislature had intended that the court retain the 
power to modify the common law rule.40 Legislatures in a few 
jurisdictions have provided specific statutory authorization for 
interspousal tort suits.41 
35. E.g" Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935). The court strictly 
construed W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19 (1931) and upheld interspousal tort immunity. 
The pertinent part of the statute states: "A married woman may sue or be sued 
alone in any court in this State that may have jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
the same in all cases as if she were a single woman .... " Id. at 190, 179 S.E. at 
605-06. See note 38 infra for the case overruling Poling u. Poling. 
36. 218 U.S. 611, 620-24. 
37. See generally Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FORUM 82 
(1972); Sanford, Personal Torts within the Family, 9 V AND. L. REV. 823 (1956). 
In view of the paucity of authority, the unsatisfactory and 
inconsistent character of the reasons advanced, the different and 
inconsistent treatment of husband and wife and parent and child, in 
several instances by the same court, and the changed economic 
conditions of the present day, the problem of a cause of action for 
personal injury should be considered an open question, meriting a more 
careful and exhaustive analysis, a more critical appreciation of the 
factors involved, and a more rational treatment than it has received in 
the past. 
McCurdy, supra note 11, at 1082. 
38. E.g., Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978). The court 
overruled Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935), and reinterpreted 
W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19 to permit tort actions between spouses. The Coffindaffer 
court attributed its reinterpretation of the statute to "the fact that the conditions 
of society [had] changed." Id. at 342. 
39. Id. 
40. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). "The failure of 
the legislature more completely to respond to the ... invitation ... does not so 
much indicate the legislature's indifference to the issue as it does its preference 
that this court should itself resolve the issue." Id. at 370, 173 N. W.2d at 418-19. 
41. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §3-313 (McKinney 1964). 
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Maryland's Married Women's Acts, enacted in 1898, completely 
revised the rights of women but did not state whether the General 
Assembly intended to give women the right to sue their husbands in 
tort.42 The 1898 enactment gave married women the right to hold 
and convey property, to engage in business, to contract, to sue and 
be sued upon their contracts, and "to sue ... for torts committed 
against them, as fully as if they were unmarried."43 
The statute did not mention the husband until two years later 
when the General Assembly added another provision to the Act, 
which, unlike the 1898 law, contained clear and precise language 
abrogating the doctrine of interspousal immunity in contract suits. 
That provision specifically authorized a married woman to "contract 
with her husband, and ... form a copartnership with her husband, 
or with any other person . . . in the same manner as if she were a 
femme sole, and upon all such contracts. . . sue and be sued as fully 
as if she were a femme sole."44 In the area of interspousal tort 
immunity, however, the intent of the legislature has not been further 
defined by statute. Until Lusby, strict judicial interpretation of the 
Married Women's Acts in Maryland precluded women from recover-
ing in tort for personal injuries caused by their husbands. 
III. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS OF LUSBY 
In reviewing the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity, 
the court of appeals in Lusby did not consider statutory construc-
tion of the Married Women's Acts or prior cases in Maryland as 
dispositive of its holding. Instead, the court approached Lusby as a 
case of first impression. The opinion traced the historical develop-
ment of interspousal immunity through Maryland case law, and 
Judge Smith factually distinguished Lusby from prior decisions 
based on the type of tortious conduct involved. Cases previously 
decided in Maryland involved interspousal suits brought by women 
for personal injuries resulting from their husband's negligence,45 or 
suits against the husband's employer46 or some third party allegedly 
responsible for the husband's negligent acts.47 Other cases dealt 
42. Law of April 9, 1898, ch. 457, § 5 (now codified and amended as MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 45, § 5 (1971 & Supp. 1978». 
43.Id. 
44. Law of April 10, 1900, ch. 633, § 1 (now codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 20 
(1971». 
45. E.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961) (husband's negligent 
operation of automobile prior to marriage resulted in wife's injuries); Furstenberg 
v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927) (husband's negligent operation of 
automobile during marriage resulted in wife's injuries). 
46. E.g., Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940) (husband's 
negligence while acting in the scope of employment resulted in wife's injuries). 
47. E.g., David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932) (wife sued owners of a 
business in which husband was a partner). 
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strictly with property interests.48 None ofthe earlier Maryland cases, 
however, involved allegations of outrageous intentional torts, as in 
Lusby. 
A. The Cases in Maryland Prior to Lusby 
A line of Maryland cases beginning with Furstenberg u. 
Furstenberg49 consistently followed the Supreme Court's decision in 
Thompson50 and strictly construed the Married Women's Acts to 
deny a wife the right to bring an action in tort against her 
husband,51 or his employer52 for personal injuries allegedly resulting 
from the husband's negligence. Relief was denied in negligence 
actions even where the cause of action arose prior to marriage. 53 The 
courts, quoting generously from Thompson, concluded that an intent 
to create personal causes of action between husband and wife was 
not expressed by the terms of the statute. 54 The legislature, the court 
reasoned, could have provided specific language in the 1898 Act 
giving women an express power to sue their husbands in tort. In 
contrast, the courts noted that the provision enacted in 1900 clearly 
and unequivocally expressed the legislative intent to give the wife a 
right to bring a contract suit against her husband or any other third 
party. 55 The consensus of opinion in cases prior to Lusby was that a 
change in the common law rule of interspousal immunity in tort 
actions, as in contract actions, should originate in the legislature. 
B. The Court's Rationale 
The court of appeals quoted Blackstone as authority on the 
rights of married persons at common law: "[T]he husband ... by 
the old law, might give his wife moderate correction ... [b]ut this 
power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, and the 
husband was prohibited from using any violence to his wife .... "56 
Under the common law, therefore, a husband did not have a right to 
commit a violent assault and battery on his wife. 
In an effort to achieve a just result without violating principles 
of stare decisis, the Lusby court did not ascribe its reasoning to a 
necessary modification of the common law nor did the court disturb 
48. E.g., Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957) (wife sued 
husband in replevin for recovery of chattels). 
49. 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927). 
50. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra. 
51. See note 45 supra. 
52. See note 46 supra. 
53. Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961). 
54. E.g., Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 249-51, 136 A. 534, 534-36 (1927). 
55. Id. at 252, 136 A. at 535-36. 
56. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444, cited in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 
338-39. 390 A.2d 77, 79 (1978). 
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prior cases strictly construing the Married Women's Acts. Instead, 
the court determined that the common law did not bar an action by a 
wife against her husband for an outrageous intentional tort.57 
Noting Blackstone and acknowledging that all prior cases were 
distinguishable inasmuch as they did not deal with intentional torts, 
the court concluded that "nothing in our prior cases or elsewhere. . . 
indicate[s] that under the common law of Maryland a wife was not 
permitted to recover from her husband in tort when she alleged and 
proved the type of outrageous intentional conduct here alleged."58 
The court held, therefore, that "[t]he type of action in the case at bar 
... [was] not ... forbidden by the common law of this State."59 
Relying on the outrageous nature of the tort in Lusby as the 
basis for its holding, the court of appeals circumvented a long 
recognized common law disability incident to marriage, which 
forbids tort suits between spouses. Although under the common law 
a husband had no right to commit a violent assault and battery 
upon his wife,so an injured wife could not recover in tort and was 
limited either to bringing a criminal action or obtaining a divorce in 
equity.61 Concededly, none of the prior Maryland cases that applied 
the immunity doctrine involved intentional tort actions, and 
therefore are distinguishable. Earlier Maryland decisions, however, 
defined the scope of the immunity rule as including all torts between 
spouses. The rule consistently applied in many of those cases was 
not limited to negligence actions, but was stated as a general 
principle of common law that "a wife could not maintain an action 
against her husband for a personal tort."62 In Tobin v. Hoffman, 
Chief Judge Sobeloff succinctly expressed the consensus of judicial 
opinion in this state prior to Lusby when he said for the court: "It is 
clear that Maryland will not entertain a suit by one spouse against 
the other for his or her tort, committed during the marital status."63 
IV. SCOPE OF FUTURE ABROGATION 
Although the Lusby court joined the emerging majority of states 
that have either modified or abolished the immunity between 
spouses in tort actions, its abrogation of the interspousal immunity 
was narrowly drawn. For instance: many courts that have departed 
from the common law rule have allowed negligence actions between 
57. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 358, 390 A.2d 77, 89 (1978). 
58.Id. 
59.Id. 
60. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444-45. 
61. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877). See generally PROSSER, supra note 
11, at 862-63. 
62. Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 521, 16 A.2d 99, 100 (1940). 
63. 202 Md. 382, 391, 96 A.2d 597, 601 (1953). 
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spouses as well as suits for intentional injuries.64 Other states have 
abrogated the interspousal immunity in actions arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents65 or suits involving intentional torts.66 In some 
jurisdictions where a departure from the immunity rule originated as 
a limited exception in an assault and battery action,67 the 
modification has been broadened in subsequent cases of negli-
gence.68 In one state where the court had previously abolished 
interspousal immunity in cases of motor vehicle negligence torts,69 
as well as cases of intentional torts,70 a recent case has extended the 
abrogation to claims arising from domestic or household negli-
gence.71 
The court of appeals in Lusby carved out a narrow exception to 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity in cases of outrageous 
intentional torts. This decision, albeit a step forward in the 
abrogation of the immunity, indicates the court's intention to 
continue to limit access to the courts in civil actions between 
spouses. In light of the erosion of the traditional public policy 
justifications favoring tort immunity between spouses, Maryland's 
limited exception should be extended to permit broader access to the 
courts. The traditional justifications for interspousal immunity -
64. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). 
65. E.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Richard v. Richard, 131 
Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973). See generally Note, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1214 
(1976). 
66. E.g., Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973) (husband intentionally 
wounded wife with knife); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977) (husband 
shot and killed wife). After discussing the origins of interspousal immunity and 
prior Texas decisions following the old rule, the Texas court concluded: 
Although most authorities recognize a distinction between a claim based 
on a negligent act and one based on an intentional tort, all agree that 
there is no sound basis for barring a suit for an intentional tort. We 
concur and accordingly we abolish the rule ... to the extent that it 
would bar all claims for willful or intentional torts. 
Id. at 927. 
67. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (wife entitled to 
recover damages from husband for broken arm resulting from husband's 
intentional tort of assault and battery). 
68. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (wife entitled 
to recover damages for slip and fall on husband's boat if slippery condition was 
caused by husband's negligence). 
69. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (wife entitled to recover damages 
from husband for injuries sustained while riding as a passenger in auto driven 
neg)igently by husband). 
70. Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974) (wrongful death action on 
behalf of wife against husband who allegedly murdered wife was sustained by 
court). 
71. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978) (wife's index finger severed 
as result of husband's negligent operation of hedge trimmer). In the companion 
case, Mercado v. Mercado, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978), the doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity was abrogated when the wife was severely burned as 
a result of husband's negligence in using a flammable cement compound near a 
gas stove. 
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preservation of domestic harmony, the danger of collusive suits, and 
the availability of alternative remedies - are no longer viable 
reasons for upholding interspousal immunity or abrogating it only 
in such limited circumstances. 
A. Intentional Torts 
There is ample justification for extending the holding in Lusby 
to abrogate interspousal immunity in all intentional tort actions. 
The Maryland court did not take full cognizance of the strong policy 
reasons for modifying the immunity rule. Recent decisions in other 
jurisdictions, however, have effectively negated the public policy 
considerations previously advanced in support of the doctrine and 
have emphasized that the needs of modern society dictate a more 
radical change in the long-established common law rule. 
In cases involving intentional torts, the preservation of the 
marital relationship is not a sufficient justification to immunize a 
spouse. Because of the brutal nature of the tort in Lusby, Judge 
Smith noted that there was no domestic harmony left to be preserved 
and, therefore, the risk of marital discord did not justify denying a 
cause of action,72 for "[a]fter discord, suspicion and distrust have 
entered the home, it is idle to say that one of the parties shall not be 
allowed to sue the other because of fear of bringing in what is 
already there."73 In all intentional tort cases involving personal 
injuries to a spouse, however, both the tortious act and the filing of 
suit reflect the unstable state of the marriage relationship.74 In a 
recent Texas case involving an interspousal suit for an intentional 
tort, the court concluded that "we do not believe that suits for willful 
or intentional torts would disrupt domestic tranquility. The peace 
and harmony of a home which has already been strained to the 
point where an intentional physical attack could take place will not 
be further impaired by allowing a suit to be brought to recover 
damages for the attack."75 
The danger of collusion in intentional tort suits between spouses 
is remote. Because of the close relationship between husband and 
wife, the possibility of collusion exists, but "courts have at their 
command ample means to cope with the real or asserted spectre of 
fraud in the context of marital tort claims."76 Moreover, insurers are 
protected by well-established investigative practices77 and criminal 
sanctions for fraud. 77a It is extremely unlikely that a person would 
72. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978). 
73. Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 667, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952) (quoted in Lusby v. 
Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 78 (1978». 
74. E.g., Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977). 
75. [d .. 
76. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 554, 388 A.2d 951, 961 (1978). 
77. Note, 11 SUFFOLK D.L. REV. 1214, 1223 n.62 (1976). 
77a. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 233 (1979). 
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submit voluntarily to serious bodily injury for the purpose of 
collecting a money judgment. Furthermore, there is generally no 
insurance coverage for intentional injuries,78 and thus any monetary 
recovery by either spouse would come from the couple's own assets. 
Consequently, there is little incentive to bring fraudulent claims in 
suits for intentional torts between spouses. 
Previously, the immunity doctrine was upheld on the grounds 
that other judicial remedies were available to an injured spouse.79 
More recent cases, however, have abolished the common law rule 
partly on the basis of the inadequate relief afforded women under 
the existing criminal and divorce laws.so Divorce and criminal 
remedies, unlike tort remedies, do not provide compensatory 
damages.81 Alimony in divorce actions may be awarded, but the 
nature of this type of recovery does not provide redress for physical 
injuries. Therefore, in cases of intentional torts between husband 
and wife, interspousal suits provide the most effective means of 
judicial redress. 
Several jurisdictions that have recently modified the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity have looked to earlier cases abrogating the 
analagous parental immunity doctrine to justify their departure 
from common law precedent.82 Many of the same policy considera-
tions advanced in support of interspousal tort immunity were relied 
on to deny a cause of action between parent and child.83 Abrogation 
of parental immunity has evolved more slowly than the abrogation 
of interspousal immunity.84 In some states, however, cases allowing 
tort suits between parent and child came first, and their rationale 
has been applied to permit subsequent interspousal tort actions.85 
78. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 699-700, 376 P.2d 70, 75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 107 (1962). ' 
79. See text accompanying note 22 supra. 
80. Id. 
81. The issue was addressed by the court in Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601,506 P.2d 
345 (1973), in the context of an interspousal suit resulting from an intentional 
tort. After stating the common justification that the injured spouse has an 
adequate remedy through the criminal and divorce laws, the court concluded 
that, 
Defendant has been convicted of a crime; the parties are now divorced. 
The criminal action enforced society's prohibition against defendant's 
conduct; it did not purport to remedy the wrong done to the victim of the 
crime. Divorce actions, which are statutory, do not purport to provide a 
remedy for personal injuries. Neither the criminal law nor the divorce 
action provide a remedy to plaintiff for the results of the knifing; a 
knifing which violated the wife's right to personal security. 
Id. at 603, 506 P.2d 347. 
82. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371,173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Apitz v. 
Dames, 205 Or. 242, 270, 287 P.2d 585, 598 (1955). 
83. See generally PROSSER, supra note 11, at 865-66. 
84. Id. at 866. 
85. See cases cited at note 82 supra. 
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In Lusby, Judge Smith cited the leading Maryland case of 
Mahnke v. Moore,86 which allowed a tort suit by a child against her 
father for "malicious and wanton wrongs."87 The Mahnke court 
stated that the parental immunity doctrine did not apply in cases 
where the parent's "acts ... show complete abandonment of the 
parental relation .... "88 The facts in Mahnke, like those in Lusby, 
involved conduct of an extremely outrageous nature.89 Mahnke's 
rationale, however, is easily applied to most intentional tort suits 
between parent and child or husband and wife. The immunity which 
arises by virtue of the relationship of the parties should not provide 
protection from liability where the tortious conduct of either party 
exhibits a renouncement of the family alliance. 
B. Beyond Intentional Torts 
Future abrogation of interspousal immunity in tort suits for 
negligence will pose difficult problems for the Maryland courts. 
Unlike the area of intentional torts, the immunity between spouses 
for negligence has been firmly established by prior cases.90 The strict 
statutory construction of the Married Women's Acts in previous 
interspousal suits involving negligence was not disturbed by the 
Lusby holding. 
Although in prior cases, the Maryland court consistently applied 
strict statutory construction to the Married Women's Acts to uphold 
interspousal immunity, the court in Lusby did not rely on the statute 
as a basis for Maryland's partial abrogation of the common law 
doctrine. In this respect Maryland differs from the majority of 
jurisdictions that have relied, at least in part, on the Married 
Women's Acts for their initial abrogation of the immunity. 
Curiously, the Lusby court discussed at great length prior Maryland 
decisions strictly interpreting the statute and emphasizing the 
necessity of an express legislative mandate to broaden the Acts to 
include suits between spouses. Moreover, Judge Smith recognized the 
alternative of reinterpreting the Married Women's Acts to permit tort 
actions between. spouses91 and acknowledged the possible applicabil-
86. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
87. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926. 
88.Id. 
89. In the child's presence, the father killed the mother with a shotgun. He kept the 
child with the dead body for six days and subsequently committed suicide in the 
child's presence. 
90. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra. 
91. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). Judge- Smith stated: 
Insofar as the interpretation to be given to the present statute is 
concerned, we have said many times that the cardinal rule of statutory 
construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent, and 
in ascertaining that intent the court considers the language of an 
enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. 
Id. at 357, 390. A.2d at 88. 
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ity of the dissenting opinion in Thompson. 92 The court, however, 
refused to incorporate statutory interpretation into its decision.93 
By refusing to base its decision on statutory interpretation of the 
Married Women's Acts, the court of appeals in Lusby made further 
abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity more difficult. 
The abrogation of the common law immunity in Lusby cannot be 
extended beyond the area of intentional torts without overruling 
prior cases. Therefore, the Maryland courts will probably await a 
legislative mandate before allowing interspousal tort suits for 
negligence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the court of appeals' decision in Lusby v. Lusby, Maryland 
joins the modern trend toward a departure from the common law 
doctrine of interspousal immunity. In most jurisdictions, the lack of 
any sound public policy for retaining the interspousal immunity 
doctrine has led the state courts to significantly modify or abolish 
the common law rule. The narrow holding in Lusby, however, limits 
the scope of tort liability between spouses to cases of outrageous 
intentional torts. Moreover, the court's distinction based upon the 
nature of the tort and Judge Smith's refusal to rely on statutory 
construction of the Married Women's Acts create problems for 
further judicial abrogation of interspousal immunity. No prior 
Maryland cases, however, have dealt with suits between spouses for 
intentional torts that are not "outrageous," and therefore courts in 
the future can allow actions for intentional torts that are less than 
"outrageous" without disturbing precedent.94 
92. [d. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88. 
Judith Bette Becker 
Richard D. Caplan 
93. The court did not explain why it was unnecessary to apply statutory construction 
in this case. [d. at 357-58, 390 A.2d at 89. 
94. In fact, House Bill No. 653, which was introduced in the Maryland House of 
Delegates during the 1979 legislative session, attempted to abrogate. further the 
interspousal immunity doctrine. This bill would have added to MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 45, § 6 the following: 
A married person may sue his or her spouse for an intentional tort 
committed against such person as fully as if the parties were unmarried. 
The bill received an unfavorable committee report, however, and was not 
enacted. 
